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I. 
STATEWENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal addresses the issues of personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, child custody jurisdiction under the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") , and the 
denial of Respondent/Cross-Appellant's fundamental right to care, 
custody and control of his children. The Respondent/Cross- 
Appellant, Larry C. Johnson ( L a r r y  filed for a divorce from 
&ppellant/C~~oss-Respondent, Claudia S. Johnson ("Claudia") on 
October 6, 2006, in Canyon County, Idaho. On October 20, 2006 an 
Order to Show Cause ordering Claudia to Return to Idaho was entered 
based upon Claudia's unilateral removal of the children from Idaho 
to New York on October 3, 2008. On November 29, 2006, the 
Magistrate entered another order, finding that New York, not Idaho 
had jurisdiction over child custody. Thereafter on February 20, 
2007, the Magistrate ordered the entire case dismissed, declining 
jurisdiction over all issues. Larry appealed the February 20, 2007 
decision and all issues included therein, including child custody 
jurisdiction. On appeal, the District Court reversed and remanded 
for reconsideration in light of Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 
167 P.3d 761(2007). Claudia appeals that decision. On remand, the 
Magistrate issued an Order Denying Summer Visitation and stayed all 
proceedings, ignoring the directives from the District Court. Larry 
appeals that decision. 
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A. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Larry and Claudia were married on June 30, 1984 in Pittsburg, 
Pennsylvania. R .  , Vol. I, p. 7 .  ) During the marriage the parties 
had three children. Id. On October 6, 2006, Larry filed a Verified 
Complaint for Divorce in the Third Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon. (R., Vol. I, p. 6-11.) 
Just three days prior to Larry filing for divorce, on October 
3, 2006, Claudia absconded with the parties' minor children from 
Idaho to Pittsburg, Pennsylvania without Larry's knowledge or 
consent. R . ,  Vol. I, p. 133-136.) On October 5, 2006, Larry was 
personally served with a document entitled, "Summons with Notice" 
for an "Action for Divorce'' from the State of New York. (R. , Supp. 
Vol. I, p. 89-90.) 
On October 20, 2006, pursuant to a motion filed by Larry, the 
Honorable Judge Orr signed an Order to Show Cause directing Claudia 
to return the minor children to Idaho and to appear before the 
court on October 30, 2006 to show cause why primary physical 
custody of the minor children should not be awarded to Larry. (R., 
Supp. Vol. I, p. 18-20. ) The Order to Show Cause was issued based 
on Claudia's unilateral removal of the children from their home, 
school, and community. R ,  Supp. Vol. I, P. 7-20.) At that time, 
Claudia did not have Idaho counsel of record. (R. , Vol. I, p. 12- 
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23.) Her counsel in Idaho would not surface until October 27, 2006. 
Id. 
On October 27, 2006, Claudia filed through counsel, a Limited 
Notice of Appearance, Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash Order to 
Show Cause and Memorandum in Support. R., Vol. I, p.1, 12-23.) 
That same day, Larry filed an AEfidavit Re: Significant Connection 
and Substantial Evidence setting forth the pertinent facts and 
demonstrating the connections Larry and Claudia had with the State 
of Idaho. (h., Vol. I, p. 21-52.) 
On November 17, 2006, Claudia filed an Affidavit attaching a 
New York Ex-Parte/In-Chambers Order to Show Cause granting 
temporary custody of the children to Claudia and directing that the 
parties' children not be removed from the State of New York until 
further order of the Court. (R., Vol. I, p. 39-42.) 
On November 29, 2006, after hearing, the Idaho Magistrate 
entered an Order concluding that New York, not Idaho, was the "home 
stater' under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA) . R , Vol. I, p. 51-52. ) The Magistrate declined 
jurisdiction over the custody issues in the case despite having 
issued the first custody order in the case. R .  , Supp. Vol. I, p. 
18-20.) The Magistrate thereafter set the remaining issues for 
trial. 
On or about December 18, 2006, Claudia filed a Motion to 
Dismiss based on 1.R.C .P. 12 (b) (8) . (R. , Vol. I, p. 2 .) On January 
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11, 2007, Claudia renewed her Motion to Dismiss, which was 
accompanied with an Affidavit of Attorney Mackenzie Whatcott in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R., Vol. I, p. 53-58.) 
The Affidavit was accompanied by yet another Ex-parte/In-chambers 
Order from the New York court stating that New York had 
jurisdiction over all matters except for in rem jurisdiction over 
property in Idaho. (R., Vol. I, p. 57-58.) Larry filed an Objection 
to Claudia's Renewed Motion to Dismiss. R .  , Supp. Vol. I, p. 77- 
8 2 . )  
On January 16, 2007, Larry filed a Motion for Visitation 
because he had not seen his children since Claudia fled from Idaho 
over three months earlier. (R. , Vol . I, p. 2. ) Larry would finally 
see his children for the first time in New York on November 13, 
2007, in connection with the trial there, over one year after 
Claudia spirited them away. (R., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 211.) 
On February 9, 2007, Claudia's counsel filed a Supplemental 
Affidavit and attached yet another Ex-parte/In-chambers New York 
Order dated February 7, 2007 which indicated that New York had 
jurisdiction over all issues of the divorce including, custody and 
visitation, child support, spousal support, and division of 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief 4 
1 property. (R., Vol. I, p. 62-64.) Larry filed a Notice of Appeal in 
New York. (R., Supp. Vol. I, P. 89.) 
A hearing was held on Claudia's Motion to Dismiss on February 
14, 2007. (R., Vol. I, p. 2-3.) The Magistrate set-up a telephone 
call with the New York judge but was prepared to rule before 
Larry' s counsel had provided argument. R .  , Supp. Vol . 11, p. 
180.) (Tr. November 17, 2006.) The Magistrate granted the Motion to 
Dismiss stating as follows: 
And what E don't want to happen is to have two 
courts in two separate states issuing two 
separate orders on who has jurisdiction. If 
New York doesn't have jurisdiction over you 
and this gets set aside, you certainly can 
come back in here and do that. But at this 
point in time, New York has from their order 
of February 7 and through their bootlegging 
under their personal jurisdiction statute says 
that they have jurisdiction over you, Mr. 
Johnson. 
(Tr. p. 31, L. 8 - L .  16.). 
The Magistrate certified the final decision pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The court further stated: 
I agree that I don't know how New York 
bootstraps through this personal jurisdiction 
act but they have and basically it looks like 
any non-residents becomes - - they have 
jurisdiction over every non-resident in the 
State of New York. But if that issue gets set 
aside, if that is an issue on appeal, and that 
gets set aside, certainly we would be the 
'That order was entered without Larry's consent and over 
formal objection by Larry's attorney in New York. (R., Supp. 
Vol. 11, p. 154-156.) 
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second state sitting below that for 
jurisdiction purposes. 
(Tr. p. 33, L. 8 - L. 15) 
Larry appealed the Magistrate's order granting Claudia's 
Motion to Dismiss. R., Vol. I, p. 75-78.) Claudia subsequently 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Larry's Appeal. (R., Vol. I, p. 98-99.) 
On appeal, on May 2, 2008 the District Court denied the Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal and reversed and remanded the Magistrate's decision 
with instructions to reconsider the case in light of Hopper v. 
Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.3d 761 (2007). R., Vol. I, p. 133- 
136.) Claudia appealed. (R. Vol. I, P. 197-201.) Larry filed 
with the Magistrate a Motion for Temporary Orders and an Affidavit 
in Support. R., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 221-227.) On remand, the 
Magistrate disregarded and ignored the instructions from the 
District Court. R .  Supp. Vol. 11, p. 250-255.) Instead of 
applying Hopper, the Magistrate denied Larry's Motion for S m e r  
Visitation and stayed the entire case leaving Larry no remedy in 
Idaho which continued to deny Larry his fundamental right to care, 
custody and control of his children. (R., Vol. I, p. 202-207) ; (R., 
Supp. Vol. 11, p. 250-255.) Larry now appeals that decision. (R., 
Supp. Vol. 11, p. 250-255.) 
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B. 
STATEM3NT OF THE FACTS 
On October 3, 2006, when Larry returned home from work, his 
children and wife were gone. R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 10-11, ¶ 2-3.) 
At 10: 45 p.m. that evening, after Larry had made several telephone 
calls in an attempt to find his family, he received a message from 
his wife, Claudia that she was in Pittsburgh visiting her mother 
who was ill. Id. It was a lie. Id. 
Two days later, Larry was served with a fax copy of a document 
from Buffalo, New York entitled "Summons With Notice" for an 
"Action for Divorce. " R .  , Supp. Vol. I, p. 15-17. ) Larry was not 
served with a divorce complaint at that time and no divorce 
complaint had iss~ed.~ Id. Larry later learned that the airline 
tickets Claudia purchased for her and the children were one way 
tickets. (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 11, ¶ 3.) Claudia never intended to 
return to Idaho, nor did she intend to visit her ailing mother; it 
was all a ruse. R .  , Supp. Vol. I, p. 22. ) Earlier in August of 
2006, as part of her plan, Claudia withdrew $15,000 from a joint 
bank account, later withdrew an additional $1,000, and charged 
three one-way tickets on a credit card. (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 59, ¶ 
4.) Claudia took the funds with her when she left idaho. Id. 
Claudia did not tell her children of her plan, nor did she tell 
'~laudia later filed a divorce oomplaint in Buffalo, New York, 
where neither party was a resident. 
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Larry that she was taking their children out of school. Id. After 
absconding to New York, Claudia repeatedly denied telephone access 
for Larry to speak with his kids. (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 22, ¶ 3-4.) 
Over ten months earlier, Larry had interviewed for a position 
as the Vice President for Advancement for Albertsons College of 
Idaho. R , Supp. Vol. I, p. 23, 9 6.) Claudia attended the 
interview and expressed to everyone in Idaho, including President 
Hoover that she was willing to relocate and commit to making Idaho 
her family's new home. (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 28.) Despite Claudia's 
contention to the contrary, on January 1, 2006, with the 
concurrence of Claudia, Larry accepted the position and they 
mutually decided that the family would move to Caldwell, Idaho. 
R ,  Supp. Vol. I p. 24, 27.) In April, Claudia and the parties' 
children traveled to Caldwell, Idaho, to look at houses and 
schools. Id. It was decided that Claudia and the children would 
remain in New York, until the end of the school year. Id. Their 
home in New York was placed on the market and sold. Id. R , Supp. 
Vol. I, p. 41, 60 '3 4.) In June, with Claudia's knowledge and 
concurrence the parties purchased a home in Caldwell. R ,  Supp. 
Vol. I, p. 24 ¶ 7.) Claudia and the children, moved to Idaho in 
July 2006. (R. Supp. Vol. I p. 24, 3 8.) 
Claudia obtained employment as a school teacher in the 
Caldwell School District and had begun her teaching position when 
she absconded from Idaho during the school week. (R., Supp. Vol. I, 
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p. 25, 3 10. ) The parties' minor children were previously enrolled 
and attended Nmqa Christian School until Claudia took them away. 
(R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 24, ¶ 9.) The children adjusted well to their 
new school and liked their teachers, the football games, and the 
Idaho outdoors. Id. 
On October 6, 2006, having learned that Claudia had absconded 
with the children to New York, Larry filed a divorce complaint in 
Canyon County, Idaho, where the parties resided. R ,  Supp. Vol. 
11, p. 224, ¶ 3. Claudia denied Larry telephone contact with his 
children. (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 22.) The Magistrate ordered Claudia 
to return the minor children to Idaho and appear on October 30, 
2006. R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 18-20, 22 ¶ ,  4 . )  That order was 
ignored. (R., Vol. I, 51-52.) 
As the proceedings in Idaho progressed, several disputes 
regarding jurisdiction arose eventually leading to the Idaho 
Magistrate dismissing the Idaho case in its entirety. (Tr. p. 31, 
L. 8 - L. 16.) (Tr. p. 33, L. 8 - L. 15,)Larry appealed to the 
District: Court, which reversed and remanded the decision. (R., Vol. 
I, p.133-136.) On remand, however, the new Magistrate disregarded 
and ignored the instructions from the District Court and again 
would not act to grant Larry reasonable visitation with his 
children. (R., Vol. I, p .  202-207.) 
Meanwhile, the proceedings in New York continued to move 
forward over formal objection. (R., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 225 ¶ 6.) On 
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December 1, 2006, Larry's attorney in New York entered a Limited 
kppearance in the New York divorce case restricting his appearance 
to custody and support iss~es.~ (R., Vol. I, p. 106.) Later, without 
Larry's knowledge or consent, his attorney in New York filed a 
general appearance on April 20, 2007. R., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 181- 
183.) Larry requested information from his attorney regarding the 
filing of the general appearance. R , Supp. Vol. 11, p. 162-164. ) 
His attorney was unc~operative.~ Id. Larry subsequently retained 
the services of a different attorney, Roger Davison, in New York. 
R., Supp. Vo1. 11, 181-183. ) . At the November 13, 2007 trial in 
New York, Larry's attorney started to put on the record that Larry 
was before the court under protest. (R., Vol. I, p. 121-122.) The 
Judge in New York found that Larry was either there and ready to 
proceed or he was not and thus the court would proceed by default. 
(R. , Vol. I, 121-122. ) Upon that threat by the court, on top of 
not seeing his children for over a year, Larry involuntarily 
remained before the court to hopefully obtain some visitation with 
his children. Id. (R., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 206-208.) 
3 ~ t  the time Larry was represented by Keith Kadish. (R. , Supp. Vol. 
11, p. 154.) 
' On January 2, 3008, when asked by the Erie County Bar Association 
why the general appearance was filed without Larry's knowledge or 
consent, Mr. Kadish explained that, while in chambers with Judge 
O'Donnell in New York, Judge O'Donnell indicated that if Mr. Kadish 
failed to file a general appearance he would enter a default judgment 
in the case on the entire matter. (R., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 214-214 ¶ 
16.) 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief 10 
On December 18, 2007, Larry was told by the Law Guardian, 
appointed by the New York Judge, that if he failed to stipulate to 
a custody schedule, he would not receive any visitation with his 
children. Id. Larry reluctantly agreed to custody, however such 
stipulation was improperly extracted by the New York court and 
involuntarily agreed to by Larry. Id. At that time, Larry had only 
seen his children one time, following court, for a two hour visit, 
since the time they were abducted from his custody and the State of 
I&E.o. . S p .  Voi. XI, p. 225, ¶ 7.) After being forced to 
stipulate, Larry was able to see his children for the second time 
on December 27-31, 2007 in idaho. Id. Despite the stipulation, 
Claudia then refused, in violation of the New York court order, to 
allow Larry to see his youngest daughter over Easter and again over 
summer vacation R .  Supp. Vol. Ii, p. 211, 224-225.) Finally 
Magistrate Schiller failed to apply Hopper as directed by the 
District Court and denied Larry's Motion for Summer Visitation, 
thereby condoning Claudia's actions, as did Judge Orr, and leaving 
Larry no remedy or way to see his children without returning to the 
New York Court. ( R .  Vol. I, p. 202-207.) (Tr. p. 13-17.) These 
facts, this stage was set by Claudia Johnson's abduction. (R., Vol. 
I, p. 7.) 
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ISSUES PIXESENTED ON APPEAL 
Larry asserts the following issues on appeal: 
1. The District Court Correctly Relied on Hopper 
v .  Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.2d 761 (2007) 
in Reversing the Magistrate and Holding that 
Idaho has Jurisdiction to make a Custody 
Determination. 
111. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. The Magistrate Abused its Discretion by 
Disregarding Instructions from the District 
Court, Denying Court Ordered Visitation and 
Staying the Entire Action. 
VI . 
A. 
GENERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Findings of fact made by the trial court will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Rohr v .  Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 
691, 800 P.2d 85, 87 (1990). Thus, any findings of fact will not 
be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial and competent 
evidence, even though such evidence may be conflicting. Id. ; 
Quiring v .  Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 563, 944 P.2d 695, 698 (1997). 
Questions of law are reviewed on appeal freely. Bliss v .  Bliss, 
127 Idaho 170, 172, 898 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995) . Jurisdiction is a 
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question of law over which the Court exercises free review. 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995) ; State 
v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998). 
The trial court's determination under Rule 12(b) (8) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure on whether to proceed with an action 
where a similar case is pending in another court is discretionary. 
Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 439, 988 P.2d 211, 213 (1999). The 
Magistrate's decision will not be overturned on appeal unless the 
trial court abxsed its discretion. Id. It is urged however that the 
court still must view the issues as a matter of law under the 
UCCJEa. See I.C. 32-11-208. When a trial court's discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court considers: (1) 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries 
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power, Inc., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Yet, the Magistrate must still apply and 
follow the UCCJEA and not condone or reinforce the improper filing 
of the case in New York. 
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This Appellate Court Shall Directly Review the District 
Court' s Decision. 
When the district court serves as an intermediate appellate 
court, this Court must review the decision of the district court 
directly. Losser v .  Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 
(2008); Bonner County v. Kootenai Hosp. Dist. (In re Daniel W.), 
145 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765(2008). In Losser, the Idaho Supreme 
Court clarified the standard of review when reviewing a decision of 
the district court acting in its appellate capacity. The Supreme 
Court determined that although for decades it had been directly 
reviewing the Magistrate court's decision independently of, but 
with due regard for, the district court's decision, the structure 
of the Idaho appellate rules require the Court to directly review 
the district court's decision and consider whether the district 
court committed error. Id. With respect to the Magistrate's 
decision, this Court must review the Magistrate's findings to 
determine whether they are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d at 760 (quoting Nicholls 
v .  Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1981)), and 
whether the decision was correct as a matter of law. 
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The District Court Correctly Relied on Hopper v.  Hopper, 144 Idaho 
624, 167 P.3d 761(2007) in Reversing the Magistrate and Holding 
that Idaho has Jurisdiction to make a Custody Determination. 
Claudia's initial argument is misplaced that the District 
Court erred by vacating the November 29, 2006 order regarding child 
custody jurisdiction because Larry did not appeal from the order 
nor did he raise the issue on appeal. 
The issues of child custody jurisdiction, subject matter and 
~ersonal juriscfiction, have been properly pursued by the Larry in 
Idaho and resisted in New York. An appeal cannot be brought until 
there is a final judgment. I.A.R. 11(A) (1). Under I.A.R. ll(a) (1) 
and I.R. Civ. P. 54(a) the final judgment was entered on February 
20, 2007, when Judge Orr dismissed the entire case. (R., Vol. I. p. 
72-74. ) The November 29, 2006 order was not a final judgment, as 
the Idaho court only declined jurisdiction over custody. 
Additionally, the November 29, 2006 order was not certified under 
I.R.C.P. 54(b). 
In addition, the order of February 20, 2007 encompassed the 
order of November 29, 2006. The November order stated that Idaho 
was only declining jurisdiction over the custody. (R., Vol. I, p. 
52, ¶ 4 The February order stated that Idaho was declining 
jurisdiction over all issues pursuant to I.R.C. P. 12(b) (8) . The 
issue of child custody jurisdiction was raised in Larry's Notice of 
Appeal. The Order of February 20, 2007 stated: 
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Based upon the file of this matter, the fact 
that there is still an action pending in New 
York which was pending when this action was 
filed and the fact that the New Pork court has 
stated that is has personal jurisdiction 
over..  [Larry] in this action and jurisdiction 
to resolve all issues, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that this action is dismissed pursuant to IRCP 
12 (b) (8) . (Emphasis added) 
(R., Vol. I, p. 72.) 
Thus, Larry appealed all issues, which included the child 
custody determination made November 29, 2006, which previous order 
was not final and could not be appealed. 
Larry's Notice of Appeal provided: 
The trial court originally rewarded Defendant 
who absconded with the children to New York, 
then deferred on the issue of custody, only to 
eventually send all issues to New York, which 
deference was not supported by law or fact. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 77, IB.) 
Finally, child custody jurisdiction was argued by Larry' s 
counsel during appeal, in both the Appellant's Brief and at oral 
argument. (R , Supp. Vol. I, p. 101-102.) (See Tr. April, 9, 2008.) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 17(f) states: 
(f) Issues. A preliminary statement of the 
issues on appeal which appellate intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list 
of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
appellant from asserting other issues on 
appeal. 
As such the district court did not err in dismissing the 
November 29, 2006 order because the issue of child custody 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n  w a s  r a i s e d  as an i s s u e  on appeal  from the  f i n a l  
judgment. 
1. Hopper v.  Hopper 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.3d 761(2007). 
Under Hopper, t h e  D i s t r i c t  cour t  found Claudia ' s  cr iminal  a c t  
of  t ak ing  the  ch i ld ren  from Idaho was rewarded i n  t h e  ensuing 
divorce  and custody a c t i o n  as she was permit ted t o  ga in  advantage 
from her  wrongful conduct. I n  Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 
P.3d 761(2007), t h e  Idaho Supreme Court found t h a t  a f a t h e r ' s  equal  
r i g h t  t c  custody under I . C .  5 32-1007 was prejudiced by t h e  mother 
absconding with t h e  c h i l d  t o  Montana. When t h e  mother absconded 
with t h e  c h i l d ,  she restricted the  f a t h e r ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  maintain a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  with h i s  c h i l d .  The Supreme Court s t a t e d :  
The proceedings should no t  have been allowed 
t o  continue f o r  t h e  durat ion with t h e  mother 
holding t h e  c h i l d  o u t  of s t a t e  while ga in ing  
a l l  of t h e  ev iden t i a ry  bene f i t s  of an enhanced 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  with t h a t  c h i l d  t o  t h e  detr iment  
of t he  f a t h e r .  The mother should have been 
ordered t o  r e t u r n  t h e  c h i l d  t o  Idaho where t h e  
f a t h e r  might exe rc i se  h i s  r i g h t s  a s  an equal  
pa ren t  and have t h i s  case  decided with t h e  
underlying l e g a l  and s o c i a l  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  it 
i s  the  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  of  a c h i l d  t o  have a 
continuing r e l a t i o n s h i p  with both pa ren t s .  
(Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho a t  628, 167 P.3d 
a t  764 (2007) ) ; (Emphasis added) . 
The Court f u r t h e r  s t a t e d :  
[mlisfor tune . . .  follows from the  conduct 
of t h e  mother and t h e  f a i l u r e  of remedial 
a c t i o n  a t  t h e  earliest s tage  of t h i s  case. 
Continuing misfor tunes  w i l l  accumulate i f  t h e  
advantage gained by t h e  mother i f  (sic) t h i s  
case  i s  allowed t o  continue contrary  t o  t h e  
fundamental s o c i a l  and criminal  law of t h e  
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state. (Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho at 628 167 
P. 3d at 764 (2007) ) ; (Emphasis added) . 
The Supreme Court, expressing disdain for the mother's 
actions, remanded the case for proceedings which required the 
mother to return the child to Idaho. 
Here, the District Court correctly recognized Hopper as 
"directly on point. " (R , Vol. I. p. 135. ) The District Court 
determined that the Magistrate should have exercised remedial 
action at the '\earliest stage" in Idaho, and not simply capitulated 
to New York's Order to Show Cause and exercise of jurisdiction. (R. 
Vol. I, p. 135.) Following the reasoning in Hopper, remedial action 
should have occurred prior to any order or custody determination 
from New York, nor should the Magistrate have deferred to New 
York's improper exercise of jurisdiction. R .  , Supp. Vol I, p. 18- 
20. ) (R. , Vol. I, p. 51-52, 135. ) The Magistrate rewarded Claudia 
for absconding to New York with the parties' minor children and in 
by doing, the court, encourages other kidnappers to do the same by 
tacitly condoning such conduct. The Idaho Supreme Court however, 
in Hopper, requires the opposite result as the District Judge 
correctly recognized. 
Claudia contends that the District Court erred in relying on 
Hopper because Idaho did not have subject matter jurisdiction and 
thus could not make any child custody determination. A parent 
cannot violate I. C. § 18-4506 (1) (a) and 32-1007 and thereafter 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief 18 
receive the "evidentiary benefits" of such wrongful conduct in 
latter proceedings such as, in this case, a determination of child 
custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The District Court 
recognized that Claudia and the children should have been directed 
to return to Idaho. Claudia has continuously gained often 
unilateral advantages and evidentiary benefits in the New York 
court because of her criminal misconduct. This case is more 
egregious than the reward of the initial behavior in Hopper. 
Appallant distlngrrishes Hopper and Schultz by arguing that 
Idaho does not have jurisdiction, as it did in Hopper and Schultz. 
In Hopper, Montana deferred to Idaho's exercise of jurisdiction. In 
Schultz, the court held that the Magistrate abused its discretion 
in ordering the automatic return of the child to Idaho. Here, the 
Magistrate abused its discretion by failing to order the return of 
the children to Idaho, the first state to issue a custody order and 
the state with the most significant current connections to the 
children, apart from Claudia's abduction. Claudia's argument for 
the inapplicability of Hopper on the basis of lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction relies entirely on the Magistrate's 
determination that New York and not Idaho was the "Home State" and 
that New York had more significant contacts under the UCCJEA. 
However, the District Court determined that to be error and 
reversed the Magistrate's decision. As the District Court correctly 
concluded, Hopper is "directly on point." If the District Court had 
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found that the jurisdiction issue was moot, then it would not have 
remanded the case in light of Hopper. The District Court implied 
that once Claudia returned to Idaho, as she should have been 
ordered to do according to Hopper, Idaho would have jurisdiction 
over all issues and New York would no longer exercise improper 
jurisdiction over the parties, the issues and the children. 
Claudia citing Navarro v .  Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 173 P.3d 
1141 (2007) argues that Hopper is inapplicable because Larry and 
Clzudia stipulated to all custody matters in New York on November 
13, 2007. Such stipulation was entered only after Larry was told by 
the Law Guardian in New York, that if he did not stipulate he would 
not have any visitation. (R., Vol. I, p. 160-172.) R ,  Supp. Vol. 
11. p. 211, 41 3.) As such, the stipulation was involuntarily 
entered and thus is voidable. 
Regardless, Larry's stipulation to custody in New York has no 
relevance to Hopper's application in Idaho. Hopper requires that 
the Magistrate take immediate action at the "earliest stage" of the 
case. The stipulation in New York was entered into November 13, 
2007 more than one year after Claudia absconded to New York and 
denied Larry any access to his children. R., Supp. Vol. 11. p. 
211, 41 3.) To force Larry to stipulate to a custody schedule 
entered nearly one year after no remedial action was taken in Idaho 
is the type of prejudice that Hopper proscribed. Had the Magistrate 
timely acted, as requested, in a manner consistent with Hopper and 
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directed Claudia to return to Idaho, there would have been no 
proper action for divorce in New York. Given that more significant 
contacts existed in Idaho, the magistrate abused its discretion by 
failing to even consider the kidnap in its ruling. The magistrate 
here as in Schultz, failed to consider - all relevant facts. By law 
the kidnap cannot be ignored. 
2. New York does not have Personal or Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
In its Order dated February 20, 2007, the Magistrate granted 
Claudia's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that an action was 
pending in New York, thereby blindly following the New York order 
which concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over Larry and 
subject matter jurisdiction to resolve all issues except the 
property located in Idaho. 
a. New York Lacked Personal Jurisdiction 
Larry was not a resident of New York nor was he served in New 
York. The New York court, in its February 7, 2007 ex-parte order, 
indicated that it had jurisdiction over Larry by virtue of "CPLR 
302 (b) " - - it's long arm statute. However, New York cannot have 
jurisdiction over Larry unless its long arm statute and application 
comports with the constitutional standard of the Due Process 
Clause, Fourteenth Amendment of the United States The Fourteenth 
Amendment permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
non-resident defendant when that defendant has minimum contacts 
with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
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offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 426 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 
154 (1945) ; see Blimka v. M y  Web Wholesaler, LLC., 143 Idaho 723, 
152 P. 3d 594, 598 (2007) . In determining the existence of minimum 
contacts, a court must focus on the relationship among the 
defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186, 204, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977) ; see Blimka, 152 P.3d at 598. 
Once a court finds requisite minimum contacts, it must then proceed 
to clekermine whether its assertion of personal jurisdiction 
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice. Burger King Corp. v .  Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S. 
Ct. 2174 (1985); see Blimka, 152 P.3d at 598. It is axiomatic that 
before a state can exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant, the defendant must "purposely avail itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1239-40 (1958). 
In the present case, New York does not have sufficient minimum 
contacts such that exercising jurisdiction comports with fair play 
and substantial justice. Larry did not have any contacts with the 
forum state except that, unbeknownst to Larry, Claudia had 
absconded to New York with his children. Larry did not purposely 
avail himself of the benefits of New York nor did he conduct 
activities in New York. Larry, Claudia and their children were all 
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residents of Idaho. Larry and Claudia were both employed fulltime 
in Idaho. Larry and Claudia owned their Idaho family home and their 
children were attending school in Idaho. Neither Claudia nor Larry 
have extended family that live in New York. Although the parties 
had previously lived in New York, they had abandoned their 
residency there when they accepted jobs in Idaho, purchased a home 
in Idaho, and moved their family and all of their belongings to 
Idaho. Without sufficient minimum contacts, New York' s feeble 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Larry violated long standing 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. New York's long arm 
statute and application to this case are unconstitutional 
In the instant case, the Magistrate plainly questioned and was 
puzzled how it was that New York could declare jurisdiction over 
Larry. Judge Orr wondered: 
I agree that I don't know how New York 
bootstraps through this personal jurisdiction 
act but they have and basically it looks like 
any non-resident[] becomes - - they have 
jurisdiction over every non-resident in the 
State of New York. But if that issue gets set 
aside, if that is an issue on appeal, and that 
gets set aside, certainly we would be the 
second state sitting below that for 
jurisdiction purposes. 
(Tr. p. 33, L. 8 - L. 15). Two years have now passed caused by that 
error. The Magistrate understood that it was unconstitutional 
for a state to take jurisdiction over every non-resident, yet 
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seemingly paralyzed, the court failed to follow the law and 
deferred to the Rew York court. Such was error. 
The Magistrate, rather than following its initial conclusion 
that it had jurisdiction over all issues, abandoned that 
j~risdiction.~ The Magistrate dismissed the Idaho case based upon 
New York' s invalid order, and thereby rewarded Claudia for 
absconding with the children and filing in New York. 
Claudia argues that the District Court erred by denying the 
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, because Larry's challenge to iuew 
York's personal jurisdiction over him was moot. Despite Claudia's 
contention that Larry voluntarily consented to personal 
jurisdiction in New York her use of the term "voluntary" is 
misplaced as is the use of the word "consent". 
Larry never consented to personal jurisdiction in New York. He 
has from the outset maintained that New York does not have 
jurisdiction in this matter. On December 1, 2006, Larry's former 
attorney in New York entered a Limited Appearance restricting his 
appearance to custody and support issues, only after Idaho had 
improperly declined jurisdiction (R. , Vol. I. p. 106. ) (R. , Vol. I, 
p. 51-52. ) (R. , Vol . I, p. 135. ) Claudia also contends, after the 
table was set in New York, that Larry's attorney in New York, 
The Idaho court had jurisdiction over custody as well as under 
the UCCJEA since the parties had a significant connection with Idaho 
and there was substantial evidence available in Idaho regarding the 
children's current care, protection, training and personal 
relationships. 
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subsequently filed a general appearance on April 20, 2007 thereby 
voluntarily waiving his right to contest personal jurisdiction in 
New York . 
New York, which initially did not have personal jurisdiction 
over Larry continued to force and coerce Larry to participate in 
litigation in New York while simultaneously denying him visitation 
with his children. In support of Claudia's contention that the 
District Court erred by dismissing the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, 
Claudia refers to Idaho iiule olC Civil Proce&~ilre 4 (i) which reads, 
"[tlhe voluntary appearance of a party or service of any pleading 
by the party except as provided in subsection (2) hereof, 
constitutes voluntary submission to the personal jurisdiction of 
the court. " 
The general appearance by Larry's attorney in New York was 
involuntary. Larry had only given his attorney authority to file a 
limited notice of appearance to challenge jurisdiction there. (R., 
Supp. Vo1. I, p. 121-133.) The relationship between an attorney 
and client is one of agency. Muncey v. Children's Home Finding & 
Aid Soc'y, 84  Idaho 147, 369 P.2d 586(1962). Whether an attorney 
can bind a client depends upon the attorney's authority to act, 
"[tithe implied authority of an attorney ordinarily does not extend 
to the doing of acts which will result in the surrender or giving 
up any substantial right of the client.'' Id .  at 151, 369 P.2d at 
588. Specifically, where jurisdiction over a party in a particular 
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case is based solely on an unauthorized appearance by an attorney, 
the judcptent in the case is void. Slack -J. Slack,  241 Cal. App. 2d. 
530(1966); C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 239 p. 237-38. 
Larry did not grant his attorney express authority to file a 
general notice of appearance. R ,  Supp. Vol. I, p.122.) In fact, 
the Retainer Agreement between Larry and his former attorney 
specifically stated that the attorney was hired to enter a limited 
appearance to challenge jurisdiction. R , Supp. Vol . I, p. 125. ) 
Larry bid not find out that Mr. Radish filed a general appearanca, 
until he hired Roger T. Davison in late July, 2007. (R., Supp. Vol. 
I, p. 123.). In front of the Erie County Bar in Buffalo, New York, 
when asked why the general appearance was filed, Larry's former 
attorney explained that while in Judge O'Donnellrs chambers, the 
Judge indicated that if Mr. Kadish failed to file a general notice 
of appearance he would enter a default judgment in the case on the 
entire matter. R., supp. Vol. 11, 215.) Such wild abuse of 
discretion was improper. 
Throughout the entire case in New York, Larry has been 
coerced and forced to appear in New York. Larry's first attorney 
was coerced in chambers into a general appearance. The New York 
court in chmabers has entered several ex-parte orders including: 
Order to Show Cause, October 26, 2006(R., Vol. 
I, p.41-42.)(Limited Appearance of Larry 
Johnson, December 1, 2006) 
(R., Vol. I, p. 39-42.) 
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Order of jurisdiction and denial of defendant 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
January 3, 2007 
(R.,Vol. I, p. 57-58.) 
Order regarding Jurisdiction, Minimum 
Contacts, Personal Jurisdiction by virtue of 
Long Arm Statute, February 7, 2007 
(R., Vol. I, p. 63-64.) 
When Larry's subsequent New York attorney attempted to place 
on the record that Larry was in New York court under protest and 
that he did not authorize his prior attorney to enter a general 
appearance, the judge agreed with Claudia's coansel who argued that 
if he was in New York under protest then he should immediately 
retire to Idaho so the New York court could proceed by default. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 121-122.) Larry who had not seen his children for 
almost an entire year was left with two choices; either participate 
and have a chance of seeing his children who were surreptitiously 
taken from him, or go back to Idaho and lose all contact and 
visitation with his children. Alas, a Hobson's choice. 
MR. DAVISON: All right. Your Honor, 
just for the - - just for the record, my 
client wants me to just place on the record 
that he's here in New York under protest and 
his - - he objects to the general appearance 
that was entered by his former counsel, Keith 
Kadish. He said that an appearance was made 
by Keith, he never authorized it, so he wanted 
me to place that on the record and I am 
placing that on the record. 
MR. MESSINA: With all due respect, then 
he should retire to Idaho and we can proceed 
by default. 
MR. DAVISON: I'm putting it on the 
record, and we're ready to proceed. 
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MR. MESSINA: He's here under his own 
free will or he's not. If he's here under 
coercion, I don' t want to be a par* to that, 
your Honor. He should leave immediately. 
MR. DAVISON: I'm telling you - - 
THE COURT: Let me ask a dumb question. 
Who authorized Mr. Kadish to appear? 
MR. DAVISON: He tells me, and I'd have 
to go back and look at my notes, but he said 
that it was a - - there was apparently a 
special notice appearance made early on by Mr. 
Kadish . 
. . . 
MR. DAVISON: And ultimately it turned 
into a general appearance on the part of him, 
and he said well, that was never authorized. 
But basically he's putting that on the record 
just to let it know that Keith did something 
that he didn' t want him to do. But her s here 
because he wants to get the rest of these 
issues litigated. 
THE COURT: Well, then what's the point 
of - - if there's no appearance, if Mr. Kadish 
wasn't authorized to appear and participate in 
these proceedings, all of these proceedings, 
including the telephone conference with the 
Magistrate in Idaho - - 
MR. DAVISON: He was authorized for that. 
THE COURT: - - then I think Mr. 
Messina's absolutely correct, isn't he? 
MR. DAVISON: We want to move ahead with 
this, but we wanted to put on the record - 
THE COURT: Well, you can't have it both 
[ ! 1 Emphasis Added. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 121-122.) 
When faced with the decision of whether to proceed in New York 
or to return to Idaho and not be able to see his children, Larry 
did what any parent would; he asked to see his children. Too date, 
all proceedings in New York were attended involuntarily, set in 
motion by Claudia's initial criminal act. 
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b. New York does not have Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
The New York residency requirement provides: 
Mckinney's DRL 5 230 (Required residence of parties) 
An Action . . .  for divorce or separation may be 
maintained only when: . . .  
2) the parties have resided in the state as 
husband and wife and either party is a 
resident thereof when the action is commenced 
and has been a resident for a continuous 
period of one year immediately preceding, or; 
3) the cause occurred in the state and either 
party has been a resident thereof for a 
continuous period of at least one year 
immediately preceding the eomeneement of &he 
action, or; 
4) the cause occurred in the state and both 
parties are residents thereof at the time of 
commencement of the action... 
In this matter, New York did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the divorce, property, debt, or spousal 
maintenance. When Claudia filed for divorce, she had been in New 
York one day, not one year required by New York law. That 
jurisdiction error is on appeal in New York R .  , Supp Vol. 11, p. 
190.) Idaho should not have acquiesced in such erroneous 
application of law by another state. Any New York order thereafter 
in the divorce action was void for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
3. Idaho, Not New York has Child Custody Jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA. 
Idaho Code Section 32-11-201 provides that Idaho has 
jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination if 
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Idaho is the home state of the child on the date of the 
cornencement of tlne proceeding, or was tine home state of the child 
within six (6) months before the commencement of the proceeding and 
the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting 
as a parent continues to live in this state. 
Idaho Code Section 32-11-102(g) defines "home state" as "the 
state in which a child lived with a parent . . . for at least six 
(6) consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a 
child custody proceeding. . . A period of temporary absence of any 
of the mentioned persons is part of the period." 
In the present case, Idaho was not the children's home state 
on the date of the commencement of proceedings because the children 
had not resided in Idaho for six consecutive months immediately 
be£ ore the commencement of the proceedings. However, neither was 
New York the home state of the children on the date of the 
commencement of proceedings because the children had not lived in 
New York for six months immediately before the commencement of 
proceedings. 
Despite the foregoing, Claudia argues that New York meets the 
definition of home state and refers to the Arizona Court of Appeals 
case, Welch-Doden v. Roberts, 42 P.3d 1166 (Az. App. 2002) and the 
Montana Supreme Court case Stephens v. Fourth Judicial District 
Court, 128 P.3d 1026 (Mont. 2006). 
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In Stephens, the family lived in Montana until 2002 when the 
parties moved to Arkansas. OR May 5, 2005, the f d l y  returned to 
live in Montana, but on August 10, 2005, the wife removed the 
children to Arkansas. 
At oral argument before the Montana Supreme Court, the husband 
conceded that Montana was not the home state, but rather argued 
that Arkansas lost its status as home state when the family moved 
to Montana in May. The court held that the home state was not 
I: ~ ~ t e d  : to the time period of six months immediately preceding the 
commencement of the action, but rather the applicable time period 
to determine home state in such circumstance should be "within six 
months before commencement of the child custody pro~eeding."~ 
Stephens, supra, followed Welch-Doden v. Roberts, supra, and 
represents a rather bold re-definition and re-write of the 
definition of home state. 
Montana, like Idaho and New York, defined home state as: "the 
state in which the child lived with a parent . . .  for at least six (6) 
consecutive months iminediately before the commencement of a child 
custody proceeding." The Stephens and Welch-Doden courts ignore the 
words "consecutive" and "immediately". In Stephens, neither Montana 
nor Arkansas were the home state since the children had not lived 
~~~arently the court concluded that if the children lived six 
months in Arkansas, of which any portion of that six months occurred 
in the last six months prior to the filing of the current action, then 
Arkansas is still the home state until a new six month clock in 
Montana had been completed. 
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in either state for six consecutive months immediately before the 
proceeding was commenced. Similarly, in Vne instant case, New York 
is not the home state of the parties' children because the children 
did not live in New York for at least six consecutive months 
immediately before the commencement of the child custody 
proceedings. Because Claudia absconded with the children, they 
were in New York on the same day or day before she filed the 
document entitled, "Summons with Notice" for an "Action for 
Divorce," which of coiirse violated the public policy of Hopper. 
Claudia is attempting to persuade this Court to ignore the words 
"consecutive" and "immediately. '' 
Moreover, Claudia ignores the cases of In re Brown, Tex. Ct. 
App., No. 2-06-263-CV, 9/14/2006, and In re the Marriage of 
Hamilton, 84 P.3d 259 (Wash. App. 2004) . In the Texas case of In re 
Brown, wife filed a Petition for Divorce in Missouri and at 4:26 
P.M. that same day, husband filed a Petition for Divorce in Tarrant 
Court, Texas. Their eleven month old son,  did not have a 
home state, in that he did not live in one state six months 
immediately preceding the filing of the custody proceeding. In the 
six months prior to commencement of the proceedings spent 18 
days each month in Texas and the balance in Missouri. 
The Texas Court of Appeals properly held that when there is no 
home state for six months immediately preceding the action, then 
the court must determine which state has significant connection 
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jurisdiction. The approach is consistent with the decision of In 
the Ineerest of Brilliant, 835 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App., El Easo, 
20021, and In Re: Amberly D., 7 7 5  A.2d 1158 (Me. 2001). 
In the case of In re the Marriage of Hamilton, 84 P.3d 259 
(Wash. App. 2004), the Washington Court of Appeals recognized that 
the children before the court did not have a home state because 
neither parent had lived in one state for six months prior to the 
proceeding. It then determined that a Court must decide which 
ststa xi11 proceed based on sigiifficaiit contacts or connections ko 
one state over the other. In Hamilton, the Washington Court held 
that it had more significant contacts than Texas, and the same is 
true about Idaho in this case. It is urged that the contacts re- 
established, created or recreated because of Claudia's abduction 
must be ignored under the UCCJEA and Hopper, Supra. 
a. Significant Connection and Substantial Evidence 
When a home state does not exist, under the UCCJEA, courts 
then must look to subsection (2) of I.C. § 32-11-201 which inquires 
whether the children and a parent have a significant connection 
with a state other than mere physical presence and that substantial 
evidence is available in that state concerning the children's care, 
protection, training and personal relationships. Larry's affidavit 
described the significant connections and substantial evidence of 
the parties in Idaho. (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 21-52.) 
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Moreover, courts should not consider connections or evidence 
acquired after improper flight to gain jurisdiction elsewhere-the 
type of forum shopping prohibited by the UCCJEA. The Idaho Supreme 
Court in Hopper was critical of the trial court rewarding the 
mother by letting her count her Montana connections, which arose 
because she absconded with the child to Montana. Hopper, 167 P. 3d 
at 627. In the case of In Re Marriage of Ieronimakis, 831 P.2d 172 
(Wash. 1992), the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
To allow Washington courts to assert 
jurisdiction because the mother generated 
significant contacts with the state is in 
effect telling any abducting parent that if 
you can stay away from the home state long 
enough to generate new considerations and new 
evidence, that is a sufficient reason for the 
new state to assert a right to adjudicate the 
issue. Such holding circumvents the intent of 
the jurisdiction laws. 
A parent cannot escape jurisdiction by abducting the children and 
keeping them in another state long enough to generate significant 
contacts. See In re the Marriage of Hamilton, supra. In the 
instant case, all of the parties and the parties' connections were 
in Idaho and there was substantial evidence in Idaho of the 
children's care, protection, training and personal relationships, 
until Claudia spirited them away. Both parties were employed in 
Idaho, the children were attending school in Idaho, the parties 
purchased a home in Idaho, and despite returning to New York. Idaho 
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had subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to I.C. § 
32-11-201(2] and it was an abuse of discretion not to exercise it. 
Larry's attorney argued at the November 17, 2006 telephonic 
hearing before the Magistrate, that Idaho had more significant 
connections than New York. The Magistrate ignored counsel's 
argument, seemingly because the court previously made up its mind 
without applying the facts to the law and failed to consider 
Claudia's unjustifiable conduct. See I.C. 5 32-11-208. An excerpt 
from that 'nearing Ls provided below: 
Larry's Attorney: I would like to at least make some 
argument, some argument here on the merits of 
the case. This is Mr. Bevis speaking from 
Idaho. One thing I would point out to 
everybody is the first order dealing with the 
issue of the custody of the children actually 
was the Idaho order, first order entered and 
first order served. And then somehow somebody 
presented a case to you in New York seeking an 
ex parte order that came after the Idaho 
order. I don' t know if you knew, if the New 
York Court knew of the Idaho order or not. 
Could the Court enlighten us on that? Before 
it entered that Order? 
NY Judge: I didn't sign the Order but they're 
telling me he did, Judge Marshall did. 
(inaudible) Oh. 
. . .  
Larry's Attorney: Oh. Well, do you want us to 
argue here, Judge, on the record? 
Judge Orr: I think I'm, I don't know if the other 
Judge is ready, but I've read over all the 
memorandums, I've read over the affidavits and 
I heard brief argument before when I was in 
Court with Mr. Welsh and Mr. Bevis, and if you 
want to present some brief argument today, 
that's Sine, but I think I'm ready to rule on 
this. 
-
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Larry's Attorney: I would just like to cover some 
things on significant contacts and that is 
that Idaho is where their home was, where 
their school was, where their community was, 
where the husband's employment was, where the 
wife's employment was, where their possessions 
were, where their mode of transportation was, 
where all the assets and debts are, where 
their counselors are, where the kidsr teachers 
are, where the most recent physician was, 
where the kids' neighbors are, where the kids' 
extracurricular activities are, their 
neighborhood, their financial stability, their 
living standard, situation and continuity are 
all in Idaho. The parties sold their home in 
New York, bought a home in Idaho, and Claudia 
resiqninecl from her job in New York and got a 
new job in Idaho. Larry got a job in Idaho 
and they all moved the family and their 
possessions from New York to Idaho. All the 
pertinent events, and the Court must ignore 
all the events that occurred after she 
absconded with those children under a ruse to 
New York, and settling in on the situational 
significant contacts and substantial evidence 
and I think that's got to be considered. She 
cannot benefit from this flight, from this 
unilateral action, from this clear violation 
of the UCCJEA. Thank you. 
(Tr. November 17, 2008 Telephonic Hearing, 
Magistrate Orr . ) 
b. Unjustifiable Conduct 
Idaho Code § 32-11-208 provides that a court with proper 
jurisdiction may decline jurisdiction if the person seeking to 
invoke jurisdiction has engaged in "unjustifiable conduct." One of 
the purposes of the UCCJEA is to "deter abductions of children." 
Claudia removed the children from Idaho unilaterally and her 
behavior violates the key underlying purposes of the UCCJEA. 
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The provisions of the UCCJEA and its predecessor, UCCJA, "seek 
to eliminate jurisdictional fishing vith children as bait." In Re 
Custody of Rector, 565 P.2d 950 (Colo. App. 1977). In the instant 
case, Claudia used the children as bait for Larry to litigate 
approximately 2000 miles away from the marital domicile in Idaho 
and the place where the family and children were domiciled. It is 
that bait that forced Larry to appear in New York in order to 
obtain visitation with his children. In the matter of Grace G. v. 
Beeno G. (12 YG.sc.3d 118C(A], 2006 V.5 2037249 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.), 2006 
N.Y. Slip Op. 51443(U) it was stated: 
-
[the] "unjustifiable conduct provision of the 
UCCJEA is designed to deter removing a child 
across state lines to secure jurisdiction". 
"There are still a number of cases where 
parents or their surrogates, act in a 
reprehensible manner, such as removing, 
secreting, retaining or restraining the 
child." This section of the UCCJEA "ensures 
that abducting parents will not receive an 
advantage for their unjustifiable conduct. If 
the conduct which creates the jurisdiction is 
unjustified, courts must decline to exercise 
jurisdiction that is inappropriately invoked 
by one of the parties.'' (Emphasis Added) 
New York precedent in Grace G. v. Beeno G. was not followed by 
New York. New York "must" decline jurisdiction given Claudia 
"inappropriate" and "unjustified" conduct. 
Claudia violated three purposes of the UCCJEA by her 
unilateral removal. Those purposes are contained in the comment to 
Section 101 as follows: 
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(1) Avoid j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  competition and 
c o n f l i c t  with cour t s  of o the r  S t a t e s  i n  
aaetters of  c h i l d  custody which have i n  t h e  
p a s t  r e s u l t e d  i n  t he  s h i f t i n g  of ch i ld ren  from 
S t a t e  t o  S t a t e  with harmful e f f e c t s  on t h e i r  
well-being; 
. . .  
(3) Discourage the  use  of t he  i n t e r s t a t e  
system f o r  continuing controvers ies  over c h i l d  
custody ; 
( 4 )  D e t e r  abductions of ch i ld ren  (Emphasis 
added) . 
Claudia abducted t h e  ch i ld ren  and s h i f t e d  them from Idaho t o  
N e w  York f o r  purposes of obta ining j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  N e w  York, which 
c rea ted  an i n t e r s t a t e  controversy over c h i l d  custody. The comment 
t o  Section 101 of t h e  UCCJEA f u r t h e r  states t h a t  t h i s  " A c t  should 
be  i n t e r p r e t e d  according t o  i ts  purposes." The New York cou r t  
rewarded Claudia f o r  her  u n j u s t i f i a b l e  conduct, and t h e  Idaho 
Magis t ra te ' s  sh i rked  i t s  UCCJEA r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  
Idaho Appellate cour t s  have genera l ly  looked down upon t h e  
u n i l a t e r a l  removal of ch i ld ren .  I n  Dymitro v. Dymitro, 129 Idaho 
527 ( C t .  App. 1996) , t h e  p a r t i e s  w e r e  l i v i n g  i n  Coeur d'Alene, 
Idaho when t h e  mother took the  c h i l d  and moved t o  Ohio and 
the rea f t e r  f i l e d  f o r  divorce.  The Magis t ra te  granted primary 
custody t o  t he  f a t h e r  i n  p a r t  based upon t h e  u n i l a t e r a l  removal of 
t h e  c h i l d  from t h e  S t a t e  of Idaho. See a l s o  Ford v. Ford, 108 
Idaho 443 (1985).  
Since n e i t h e r  Idaho nor New York has home state j u r i s d i c t i o n  
over t he  i s sues  i n  t h i s  custody case ,  t h e  Court must look t o  
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significant connections and substantial evidence, almost all of 
which rest in Idaho. In considering thak inqpliry, it is also clear 
that & Idaho had subject matter jurisdiction over the entire 
case. Alternatively, if it is determined that New York had 
-
jurisdiction due to significant connections and substantial 
evidence, New York should have declined jurisdiction based upon 
Claudia's unjustifiable conduct. See Hopper, supra. 
4. Idaho is the only state with Personal and Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction. 
Idaho has personal jurisdiction and subject matter 
jurisdiction over the parties in this action as the parties resided 
in Caldwell, Idaho, and Idaho was the marital domicile of the 
parties when irreconcilable differences arose. See I.C. 5 5-514(e). 
Larry has been a resident of Idaho for over 2 years, 10 months, 
since December 2005. Claudia had been a resident for more than six 
weeks upon moving to Idaho July 18, 2006 and absconding to 
Pittsburg October 3, 2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 15.) The Magistrate's 
determination that New York, not Idaho, was the "home state" was 
error. The district court found such determination was clearly 
error. Neither Idaho nor New York is the Home State under the 
UCCJEA. Idaho has more significant contact under the UCCJEA and the 
only state with proper jurisdiction. New York lacked subject 
matter and personal jurisdiction over all issues except perhaps 
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custody, yet it even lacked custody jurisdiction for lack of 
significant connection given Claudia's abduction 
The Magistrate Abused it Discretion by Disregarding Instructions 
from the District Court, Denying Court Ordered Visitation and 
Staying the Entire Action. 
The Order on Appeal and Motion to Dismiss entered May 2, 2008 
reversed the Magistrate's decision and remanded the case for 
"reconsideration in light of Hopper. The District Court stated: 
Likewise, here, to pem.it the Magistrate's 
erroneous decisions in refusing to exercise 
jurisdiction to stand rewards Claudia Johnson 
for absconding with the children and 
preventing them from continuing their 
relationship with their father 
The District Court in reversing the Magistrate and remanding 
with instructions to apply Hopper directed the Magistrate to 
exercise jurisdiction in Idaho. Yet, the Magistrate ignored the 
direction on remand from the District Court and such was an error 
of law. The Magistrate must apply and follow the law. Pizzuto v.  
State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995). Respondent filed 
a Motion for Temporary Orders and Motion for S m e r  Visitation 
after remand. On remand, the Magistrate declined to issue an order 
for s m e r  visitation. ( R ,  Vol. I, p. 202-205.)  gain, the new 
Magistrate surrendered, just as Magistrate Orr had done, to New 
York's exercise of jurisdiction. When asked why Larry could not 
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receive summer v i s i t a t i o n ,  Judge Sch i l l e r  s t a t e d  g l i b l y  "because 
Xew York says he canr t. " 
'\MR. BEVIS: What you're seeing is  constant 
e f f o r t s  t o  s t a l l  and delay by the at torneys 
and Claudia. For example, j u s t  look, Judge 
Drescher says you got  jur i sd ic t ion  and go 
forward i n  accordance with Hopper. If you 
continue t o  l e t  it s i t  and l e t  New York do 
t h i s  t o  Larry, then you're r e a l l y  continuing 
t o  v i o l a t e  Hopper. Because t h i s  i s  a l l  -- 
. . . 
THE COURT: - - . . . However, I recognize I ' m  
bound by t h a t  decision. 
MR. BEVIS: Thank you. I appreciate it. 
Because I know you w i l l  follow khe law and 
t h i s  is  a case t h a t ' s  been remanded. 
THE COURT: A s  bes t  I can. 
THE COURT: But you have a remedy. You can go 
l i t i g a t e  the  s t ay  i n  New York S ta te .  You have 
a remedy. 
MR. BEVIS: That v io la te s  Hopper. I don't  
think you can continue t o  r e f r a i n  from 
exercis ing your obligation t o  go forward on 
THE COURT: O r  I can s tay  the  proceedings 
pending appeal 
. . . 
THE COURT: I can s tay  the proceedings pending 
appeal, can' t I? 
MR. BEVIS: You could -- 
. . .  
MR. BEVIS : You do have the r i g h t  t o  -- b u t ,  a t  
t h i s  poin t  i n  t i m e ,  you a l s o  have an 
obl igat ion t o  go forward with the t r ia l .  I 
don ' t  think you can jus t  wait u n t i l  the  
Supreme Court of Idaho ru les .  I mean -- 
THE COURT: You're saying I don' t  have the  
a b i l i t y  t o  s t ay  and -- 
MR. BEVIS: No. You have the a b i l i t y  t o  s t ay .  
THE COURT: Right. So -- 
MR. BEVIS: But I think you've got  t o  set it 
down f o r  a t r ia l .  If you s i t  and 
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THE COURT: -- how do I - how do I stay and 
set it for trial? That doesn't make any sense 
'. co -- 
THE COURT: I can stay all proceedings pending 
appeal, because basically the appeal is over 
whether or not I have jurisdiction to begin 
with. That's the issue to be appealed. If 
the Supreme Court says, Judge Orr was correct 
and New York should have taken jurisdiction, 
then my trial that I try pending the appeal is 
a total waste of time, effort and money. 
MR. BEVIS: Why should we have to appeal twice? 
. . .  
MR. BEVIS: I know. You gotta understand. I 
mean, I think from this standpoint, Judge, 
that this is a custody and visitation issue 
and your powers to rule on interim custody and 
visitation already remain with you. Now if 
you choose not to exercise those powers, I 
guess that's reviewable. But as a practical 
matter, you have the right to go forward on 
custody, visitation and child support, and 
that's the way it should be, because there 
could be a case simply such as this, where a 
person's entitled to their visitation and the 
Court is exercising those rights in order to 
make sure that those visitation rights go 
forward. 
Again, can anybody tell me right now why he 
can't see his children in the summer? Does 
anybody know why he can't see his children in 
the summer? 
THE COURT: Because the New York Court says he 
can' t . 
-
The Magistrate cannot ignore directives from the District Court. 
The case should be remanded to yet another Magistrate who will 
follow the law and exercise jurisdiction in Idaho and finally give 
Larry his fundamental right to care, custody and control over his 
children after two years of being deprived that right here in 
Idaho. 
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kespondent is Entitled to Attorneys Fees on Appeal 
A judge may award the prevailing party attorney fees under 
I.C. fj 12-121 if the "appeal was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundatjon. " Minich v.  Gem 
State Developers, Inc, 99 Idaho 911 (1979). By improper forum 
shopping and resisting jurisdiction in Idaho, at great expense to 
Larry, Claudia continues the effect of her abduction on appeal, 
which appeal is u..reasonable given the concept of personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction and the public policy underlying Hopper 
and the UCCJEA. Accordingly Larry requests attorneys fees on costs. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly relied on Hopper v .  Hopper, 144 
Idaho 624, 167 P. 3d 761 (2007) in reversing the Magistrate, holding 
that Idaho has jurisdiction to make the custody determination. This 
Court should affirm the District Court and remand to yet another 
Magistrate who will follow the instructions of the District Court. 
c-l; 
DATED this 2 day of fi - , 2008. 
BEVIS, THIRY & SCHINDELE, P.A. 
Attorney for Respondent/Cross- 
Appellant. 
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